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Abstract—Given the role of agriculture sector in an economy 
and its vulnerability in terms of disasters, direct monetary 
transfers are paid from tax-payers to agriculture producers in 
many countries. Government policies are expected not only to 
provide higher and more stable income to producers but also to 
create incentives to attract rural households to continue farming. 
Nevertheless, these policies have been doubted for inducing 
economic inefficiency because the later piece of effect masks the 
market signal for resources and risk allocation. This research 
uses a dual-economy model with inter-sectoral flow of labor and 
commodity to justify government policies that discourages rural 
producers to work in urban sectors. The result of the model 
shows that when there is no disaster insurance market, migration 
behavior should be controlled and fiscal transfer do improve 
economic efficiency. When there is disaster insurance market in 
this economy, market mechanism can achieve social optimal 
allocation if goods tradability is perfect. When goods tradability 
is imperfect, migration behavior in the insurance equilibrium 
should be controlled if the migration costs is low, or vice versa. 
Government intervention is necessary to encourage or discourage 
migration in each case, respectively. 
Keywords—inter-sectoral disaster risk diversification, labor 
mobility, goods tradability, government intervention 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture is such an important sector to an economy that 
its role has been intensively and repeatedly discussed by 
economists [1,2,3]. It is also the common wisdom that 
“agriculture is subject to greater risk and uncertainty than most 
other sectors of the economy” [4]. In many countries it is taken 
special care of by governments. Various kinds of policies are 
carried out to support rural producers, e.g. direct product price 
intervention, lump-sum subsidy for farming, lump-sum subsidy 
for technique advance, disaster aid, as well as crop insurance 
programs with heavy premium subsidy. Among these policy 
instruments, government initiatives which are not neural to 
producers’ decision-making have been doubted for 
undermining economic efficiency, as they are likely to hamper 
resources from flowing to the places where they can be more 
efficiently used [5]. For instance, the rural-urban disparity in 
China has induced decade-long seasonal migration pattern in 
Mainland China. The household registration system (Hukou),
however, has been inducing huge transaction costs for rural 
laborers to work in urban sectors and the removal of it may 
induce large flow of permanent rural-to-urban migration [6]. 
Recently, the Chinese government has carried out a series of 
policy instruments as mentioned to slow down the widening 
rural-urban income gap [7]. Nevertheless, the removing of 
household registration system which can definitely increase the 
labor market efficiency is not among the policies carried out.  
One of the major reasons of “inefficient” allocation is the 
worry that free migration may undermine the self-sufficiency 
of food of a country. It is a trade-off among economic 
efficiency, equality, and risk-bearing. This research is then to 
discuss whether the migration of farmers to the sectors paying 
higher and more stable salary should be encouraged or 
discouraged. The model uses the framework of inter-sectoral 
disaster risk diversification in a simple dual-economy structure, 
following the most classic manner of discussion on inter-
regional and inter-sectoral resources and risk allocation in the 
field of public economics [8,9]. Labor mobility and goods 
tradability are taken into account as the susceptible excuses for 
“inefficient” policy. In the model, the assumptions on factor 
mobility and goods tradability are abstracted from what is 
going on in China. Meanwhile, the concept of collective risk 
[10,11] is incorporated into this model so that the feature of 
disaster risk, mutual dependency among risk units, is reflected.  
The structure of this paper is arranged as follows: Section II 
introduces key assumptions of this model. In section III, IV, 
and V, the model introduces its benchmark equilibrium, social 
optimum and Malinvaud-Arrow insurance [12,13] equilibrium, 
respectively. They are then compared in section VI to verify 
the policy instrument. Until here the model is described with 
the fewest details due to the page limit. For details of model 
development, please kindly refer to [14]. Based on the basic 
results, further discussion is put forward on optional 
intervention approaches to improve the efficiency of 
decentralized approaches. In the final section, the model is 
concluded and some discussion is put on policy implications as 
well as further research topics.
II. THE MODEL
A. Key assumptions 
1) The small world in the model 
Consider a small closed economy with two regions and two 
sectors, both rural and urban. The rural sector is in the rural 
area, producing the so-called rural goods while the urban sector 
is in the urban area and produces urban goods. Products are 
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used for private consumption by residents and physical capital 
investment. Suppose there are N1 people residing in the rural 
area and N2 residing in the urban area. Labors are assumed to 
be homogeneous in terms of natural endowment, including the 
quality of human capital for all residents and agriculture land 
for rural residents. An individual’s welfare state is determined 
by his consumption on both kinds of goods.  
2) Factor mobility 
The rural-urban migration in China is a kind of ex ante,
seasonal, and circular rural-to-urban move. Due to the 
existence of household registration (Hukou) system, it is very 
difficult to change one’s status from “rural resident” to “urban 
resident”. Therefore, most migrants leave families behind, 
return to their families during periods of holiday or 
unemployment, and seldom assimilate with the urban 
population [15, 16]. They generally start to move to urban areas 
right after the Chinese New Year, which is ahead of the 
planting season. They work in large cities for the whole year 
and return to hometown when the festival comes again. In this 
sense, the model is described in a static manner as the 
“migration” is actually seasonal move which repeats from one 
year to another. The move is also unidirectional: currently there 
is no evidence showing that urban residents are moving to work 
in rural sectors in China.  
Labor mobility is represented by a lump-sum transaction 
cost in this model, denoting the costs for travelling, getting job 
permission, and hunting for a job. It is assumed that all 
seasonal workers can get jobs in the urban sector. 
Unemployment is popular in inter-regional migration models 
but is not taken into account in this model.  
In rural China, land for agriculture production is owned by 
the “collective” while the “use-right” is allocated to farming 
households, which was prohibited to transfer. When a 
household leaves for urban areas for a seasonal job, it retains its 
use-right but asks someone else, e.g. friends, relatives, or 
neighbors, to cultivate the land for it. In this model it is 
assumed that the land is left uncultivated if the “user” goes to 
the urban sector, for the sake of simplicity. In this sense, factor 
mobility in this model refers only to labor mobility.  
B. Events and time sequence 
1) Decision-making on the seasonal move 
At the beginning of each period, rural residents consider 
whether to move to the urban area or not. If one decides to stay, 
he cultivates the land and is then called the “rural worker”. If 
one decides to move, he is then called the “seasonal worker”. 
So before the seasonal move starts we have two groups of 
individuals: rural residents and urban residents. After that, we 
have three groups of individuals, rural workers, urban residents 
and seasonal workers, which are given subscripts of 1, 2 and 3 
in the following part of this paper, respectively.  
2) Production  
In this phase, workers start to produce goods. Rural workers 
produce the so-called “rural goods” on household basis. It is 
assumed that each rural worker contributes inelastically a unit 
of labor in production, which is assumed to be an optimum 
amount. This assumption stands in this model as our focus is 
rural-urban migration rather than on-farm decision-making. If 
no uncertainty is taken into consideration, rural workers will 
exactly produce the same amount of output, X .
In the urban sector, production is finished in an aggregate 
manner following technology of Y=(K,L) , in which K is the 
total social capital stock for production and L is the total labor 
force engaged. The wage rate is determined by the marginal 
productivity with respect to labor, w=YL(K ,L) . It is assumed 
that the technology shows constant-return-to-scale with respect 
to labor input so that w is a constant. This assumption excludes 
the possibility of externality induced by technology and helps 
to catch the essential impact from mobility and tradability. An 
urban worker’s working hours is mandatorily designated, e.g. 8 
hours/ day. It can be further simplified by normalizing working 
hours to 1. Thus the labor income for an urban worker is 
exactly w.
The move to the urban area is costly. Rural residents who 
move to work in urban sector are supposed to pay a lump-sum 
cost, denoted by c, for the move. For the sake of simplicity, the 
model allows seasonal workers to pay this cost after wages are 
paid. So the actual income for a seasonal worker is w–c.
3) The state of the world 
In this model production of both sectors is exposed to 
natural disaster risk. Natural disaster risk is defined as a two-
stage compound lottery according to the collective risk theorem 
[10, 11]: firstly, the nature chooses the size, geographical 
location, and severity of the hazard, determining the collective 
state of the world t={0,1,…,T-1}. As for rural sector, in 
accordance to assumption on production functions, it is 
assumed that rural production activity could fall in different 
individual states when a certain collective state occurs and 
consequently rural workers may have different harvesting after 
some disaster events X (s) , s={0,1,…,S-1}. On the other 
hand, the entire urban sector falls into some same state as it is 
assumed to be a “big” company and all urban workers will 
have uniform ex post income w( t ) . In other words, individual 
states of urban workers coincide with the collective states of 
the world.  
The probability for a piece of land being in a joint state (s, t)
is ( ), 0s tπ > , with ( ), , 1s t s tπ =¦ . The probability of the 
production of a specific plot of land with output of X(s)  could 
be derived as the conditional probability of 
( ) ( ) ( )| , ,ss t s t s tπ π π′ ′= ¦ . Then exactly there would be 
( ) 1|s t Nπ ⋅  pieces of land in individual state s when collective 
state t occurs. When seasonal moves are taken into account, the 
number of cultivated land reduces by n, the same as the number 
of seasonal workers. The theorem applies when we assume that 
the land of seasonal workers is distributed uniformly in the 
space. In this sense, the number of cultivated but damaged land 
in a joint state of (s, t)  is ( ) ( )1 1 1|s t N N n Nπ ⋅ ⋅ −  = 
( ) ( )1|s t N nπ ⋅ − , while social aggregate output of rural goods 
is ( ) ( ) ( )1|s s t N n X sπ −¦  = ( ) ( )1 EXN n t− .
4)  Trade and consumption 
Consumption of workers starts after the state of the world is 
known. Goods tradability is denoted by transaction costs for 
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delivering per unit of rural and urban goods, δx and δy,
respectively. If the relative price of rural goods to urban goods 
is denoted by p, the budget constraints for workers are 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, 1 ,yp t X s x s t y s tδ− = +ª º¬ ¼ , for all s, t, (1)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2xp t x t y t w tδ+ + =ª º¬ ¼ , for all t, and (2)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 3xp t x t y t w t cδ+ + = −ª º¬ ¼ , for all t (3)
Seasonal workers are supposed to pay δy instead of δx. It is 
because seasonal workers stay in the urban area almost all the 
time in a year except a few days for holiday at hometown. 
Social budget constraints are denoted as: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 2 2 3, 0N n X x s t N x t nx t− − − − ≤ª º¬ ¼¦ , for all s, t (4)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 2 2 3 2,N n y s t N y t ny t Y N n C− + + ≤ + −¦ , for all s, t, (5)
in which C is the social aggregate consumption on 
transportation to move seasonal workers and goods 
between rural and urban areas. Since the model is in a static 
manner, dynamic investment decision is not essential to our 
discussion. Therefore, discussion on the capital stock 
investment for production of the next period can be skipped. 
By assuming the economy is running at its steady state 
where the return to capital stock is fixed, social consumable 
urban goods can actually be denoted by 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2Y N n C N n w t C+ − = + − .
III. THE BENCHMARK CASE
A. Individuals’ optimum choice 
After the state of the world is determined, an individual 
tries to maximize his ex post utility given his state-contingent 
wealth, ( )iω ⋅ . In this benchmark case, it is equivalent to state-
contingent labor income, ( )ie ⋅ . We assume that the ex post
utility function shows the preference of constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) between rural and urban goods with 
elasticity of   and 0x xxu u> > , 0y yyu u> > , 0xyu > . According 
to the budget constraint of individuals and the balance in goods 
markets, ex post equilibrium follows 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 EXxp t B t N n tδ+ = −ª º¬ ¼ , for all t, (6)
with ( ) ( ) ( )2B t N w t n w t c= + −ª º¬ ¼ . In this sense, individuals’ 
optimum choices are derived as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )













x s t X s y s t p t X s
x t w t p t y t w t




= = − +
= + = −
= − + = − −ª º ª º¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
, (7)
for all s, t with ( )1β = + . Social aggregate economic value 
of goods can be denoted as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 EX xt B t N n tδΩ = + − − , for all t (8)
An individual’s ex post indirect utility depends only on his 
state-contingent wealth and the relative price: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )i i iv A p t ω⋅ = ⋅ , for all t, (9)
with ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 1 11 1 1 yA p t p tδ −− + += + + ª º¬ ¼

    and 
( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11i xA p t p t δ −− + += + +ª º¬ ¼
 
    for i=2,3 and for all t.
We further assume that individuals’ ex ante utility is a 
function ( )( )iW v ⋅  showing constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) preference. Expected ex ante utility can be derived as 
( ) ( )( ),E i i is tW W vπ= ⋅ ⋅¦ . The ex ante equilibrium is reached 
when the marginal seasonal worker finds himself indifferent of 
working either in the rural sector or the urban sector, that 
3 1E EW W= . As comparative statics imply that expected ex 
ante utility show monotonic change with respect to the change 
in the number of seasonal workers, ex ante equilibrium exists 
and is unique.  
IV. SOCIAL OPTIMUM ALLOCATION OF DISASTER RISK
Consider the optimal risk allocation and population 
distribution problem in the society. The central planner is 
supposed to maximize the weighted sum of expected utility 
functions. The social optimization problem is:  
( ) ( ) ( ) 11 2 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 3, , , ,
max E E E
N nn s t t t




= + +¦ ,
in which iγ  denotes the weight allocated to individuals of type 
i by the central planner. This problem is subjected to  




t s t N t n t t
W W
α ω ω ω
μ
+ + = Ω¦ , (10)
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 30 , , , , 0n N s t t tω ω ω≤ ≤ ≥ , for all s, t
The Greek letter ahead of each constraint is its 
corresponding Lagrange Multiplier. By assuming interior 
solutions, first-order conditions are 
( )
( )






3 31 1 1 2
2
1 1 2 3
,
n dWN n dW dWt
t N n d s t d t n d t
γ μγ μα
γ
π ω ω ω
− ⋅− + ⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ = = ⋅
−
, (11) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2






d W d WW N n n N
dn dn
d t d Wd Wt s t t
dn dn dn
γ γ γ γ γ
α ω ω μ
− + − + +ª º¬ ¼
Ωª º § ·
+ − + − − =« » ¨ ¸© ¹¬ ¼
¦
, (12)
for all s, t. Equation (11) implies that the allocation of wealth 
among individuals should equalize the weighted ex ante utility 
across all individual types in a given collective state t. In this 
sense, rural workers’ consumptions are not dependent on 
individual states any more, ( ) ( )1 1,s t tω ω=  for all s, t.
Equation (12) implies that the allocation of labor (the number 
of seasonal workers) must equalize marginal social benefit and 
marginal social cost of having one more rural resident to work 
in the urban sector.  
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If we assume ex ante utility function is in log form (the 
degree of relative risk aversion is 1), the optimization problem 
can be solved as ( ) ( )i it tω ρ= Ω , with: 
( )
( ) ( )





































, for all t (13)
in which eα  denotes the Natural logarithm with 
( ) ( )lni it t A tα π=¦ .Equation (13) implies that individuals 
of the same type can consume the amount of goods worth a 
fixed proportion of social aggregate economic value, 
independent of the state of the world.  
V. INSURANCE MARKET ALLOCATION OF DISASTER RISK 
When there is M.A. insurance system in this small world, 
the sequence of events change to: a) decision-making on 
migration; b) underwriting of M.A. insurance policy; c) 
production; d) determination of the state of the world; e) 
exercise of insurance contract, trade, and consumption. For the 
convenience of discussion, we still allow individuals to pay 
premium of M.A. insurance ex post. The individuals’ 
optimization problem is denoted by the equation below:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ), ,max Ei i i i im s t a t W W vπ ω= ⋅ ⋅¦ , for i=1,2,3 
subject to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 3






i i i it
s t e s t m s t s t m s t
a t r t a t
t e t a t r t a t







′ ′= + −
′ ′+ −
′ ′= + − =








for all s, t. m(s, t)  is the mutual insurance coverage against a 
joint state of (s, t) . Urban workers do not use the mutual 
insurance system as they have no difference in their individual 
states. ai( t)  denotes the amount of Arrow security held by 
individual of type i and r( t)  denoting the market-clearing price 
of per unit of Arrow security against a collective state t.
The M.A. insurance market equilibrium implies that full-
cover mutual insurance 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 , 0m s t p t X X s= −ª º¬ ¼ , for all s, t, (15) 
where we use X(0)  to denote the individual damage-free state. 
In this sense, after fulfilling the mutual insurance contract, rural 
workers have the same state-contingent wealth equal to the 
expected labor income across all individual states. Finally, the 
equilibrium of M.A. insurance system follows 










′Ω Ω¦ , for all t (16) 
( )









Ω Ω¦ ¦ ,  (17) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i itt t t e t tω π′ ′ ′ ′= Ω Ω¦ , for all t (18) 
It is an interesting feature of the M.A. insurance to allow 
individuals of the same type to consume exactly the amount of 
goods with a fixed proportion of social aggregate economic 
value irrespective of the state the world.  
VI. EFFICIENCY ISSUES 
We are interested in how factor mobility and goods 
tradability affect the efficiency of allocating resources as well 
as disaster risk in this small world. In order to make the social 
optimum and market solution comparable, we apply the 
necessary condition for equivalency of social optimum and 
market solution [13], 1i iγ λ = . As equations are not tractable 
analytically, numerical examples are employed to show the 
impact intuitively. For instance, let 
t=(0,1) , π( t=0)=0.5 π( t=1)=0.5;  s=(0,1) ,  π(0 |0)=1,  
π(1 |0)=0,  π(0 |1)=1/3,  π(1 |1)=2/3 ;  N 1=30000,  
N2 =10000; X(0)=20, X(1)=5;  w(0)=30 ,  w(1)=20;  
EX(0)=20,  EX(1)=10;  1= ;and use x yδ δ δ= =  and c as 
parameters. Numerical results are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. 
The numerical examples imply that when goods tradability 
is perfect, M.A. insurance market can achieve social optima. If 
there is no insurance market working, the seasonal move 
should be discouraged. When goods tradability is not perfect 
with positive transaction costs, the social optima and M.A. 
insurance equilibria diverge. Seasonal moves should be 
encouraged when the transaction costs for shipping goods are 
high, or vice versa.  
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The divergence implies that externality is induced due to 
the existence of imperfect goods tradability, the transaction 
costs in transporting goods between rural and urban areas in 
this model. Therefore, government intervention is necessary to 
modify the M.A. insurance equilibrium. 
VII. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
In order to save the efficiency loss induced by the 
externality, the intervention is expected to change rural 
residents’ decision-making about seasonal move. There are two 
types of government intervention to achieve the desirable 
efficient allocation of labor force between sectors. 
1) Lump-sum transfer 
Suppose that the government uses lump-sum transfer of 
wealth in terms of urban goods among three types of 
individuals, budget constraints of individuals change to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3EX , ,
i i i i it
e t p t t e t w t e t w t c
t e t a t r t a tω τ
′
= = = −
ª º′ ′= + − +¬ ¼¦ , for all t, (19)
and i=1,2,3. In (19) iτ  is the lump-sum transfer of wealth 
which is assumed to be conducted ex ante. In this sense it 
represents tax/ subsidy against the seasonal move when it is 
negative/ positive. The sequence of events changes to: firstly 
the government announces the lump-sum transfer program; 
rural residents adjust decision-making on the seasonal move 
taking government policy into account; by observing rural 
residents’ behavior, the government chooses its optimal 
intervention strategy to adjust the number of seasonal worker to 
the social optimal one.  
The individual’s optimization problem implies that:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Li i i itt t t e t t tω π τ ρ′ ′ ′ ′= Ω + Ω = Ωª º¬ ¼¦ , (20)
which is straightforward by substituting ( )i ie t τ+  for ( )ie t  in 
(18). Again we observed that individuals’ state-contingent 
wealth is a fixed proportion of social aggregate wealth even 
with government intervention, denoted by Liρ . Then the 
redistributive vector achieves efficiency if the number of 
seasonal workers determined by the market approach with 
government intervention equals the social optimal one. If *Liρ
meets the requirement, the intervention plan can be denoted as: 





i i t t





= −« »Ω Ω¬ ¼
¦ ¦ (21)
Note that we can have a number of intervention strategies 
that guarantees 1EW  and 3EW  equalized at the social optimal 
population distribution pattern. The government can do so by 
allocating rural and seasonal workers a lot of goods but urban 
residents only a few to consume, or vice versa. This situation 
occurs because urban residents have nothing to do with the 
allocation of labor and the government can allocate them any 
arbitrary amount of goods without losing efficiency. If the 
central planner wishes to maximize social welfare 
simultaneously then the intervention should let *2 2
Lρ ρ=  as 
determined in (13). Alternatively, if the government wants to 
make the working-load and side effect of intervention 
minimum, then just simply let 2 0τ = .
It is straightforward that the budget constraint of the 
government holds, ( )1 1 2 2 3 0N n N nτ τ τ− + + = , as budget 
constraints of all other groups of individuals hold.  
2)  Subsidy system on insurance premium. 
The intervention strategy is as follows: the government 
imposes a tax χi on individual of type I and offer mandatory 
premium rates Ri( t)  for them. Individuals choose personal 
optimum amount of insurance coverage, ai( t) , taking χi and 
Ri( t)  as exogenous parameter. After observing individuals’ 
optimum behavior, the government chooses combinations of χi
and Ri( t)  to adjust the number of seasonal workers to the 
social optimal one; then the subsidy system with subsidy on 
premium rate Ri( t)–ri ( t)  and lump-sum tax χi is determined.  
Therefore firstly let us look at the optimization problem of 
individuals. The budget constraints are: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3
:
EX , ,
i i i i i i it
t t e t a t R t a t
e t p t t e t w t e t w t c
ζ ω χ
′
ª º′ ′= − + −¬ ¼
= = = −
¦
, for all t (22)
First-order conditions can be derived as: 
( ) ( ) ( )












− =¦ , (23)
and optimal choices can be derived as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i itt t R t e t R tω π χ′ ′ ′= −ª º¬ ¼¦ (24)
The subsidy system on insurance premium is successful if the 
number of seasonal workers determined by this intervened 
market equilibrium equals the social optimal one. If the 
redistribution ( )*Pi tω  satisfies this point, the intervention 
strategy is determined by: 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )* * * *, 1
i
i iP P P Pt t t
i i i i
t t t e t t
R t
t t t t
π π π πχ
ω ω ω ω′
′ ª º
= = −« »
′ ¬ ¼
¦ ¦ ¦ ,(25)
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for all t. Again there are a number of intervention strategies for 
the same reason as mentioned before. The budget constraint of 
the government is automatically met since all other groups of 
agents are following their budget constraints.  
VIII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The authors have constructed a model to discuss the 
disaster risk diversification and labor allocation problem 
between rural and urban sectors. It takes a focus on the 
migration behavior (the seasonal move in this model) as a sort 
of risk management practice of rural labors. The result of the 
model implies that it is inappropriate to argue whether the 
government should encourage or discourage rural residents to 
move to work in urban sectors universally. It can be seen in the 
model that when goods are assumed to be free to trade, the 
number of seasonal workers should always be controlled, either 
with centralized or decentralized instruments. When the 
transaction costs for shipping goods are taken into account, 
however, rural residents should be discouraged to work in the 
urban sector to some extent in case that the transaction costs for 
moving is low, or vice versa. When goods are perfectly 
tradable, the M.A. insurance market allocates exactly social 
optimal number of seasonal workers. When goods tradability is 
not perfect, however, externality rises and the M.A. insurance 
system cannot achieve efficient allocation of labor between 
sectors.  
Government intervention is necessary to correct the 
efficiency loss induced by the externality. The paper proposed 
two types of intervention strategy. The one is lump-sum 
tax/subsidy on the seasonal move and the other is subsidy 
system on insurance premium which is widely adopted in many 
countries. The proportional instrument, however, needs large 
amount of private information of individuals since it is 
implemented based on individual-dependent lump-sum tax and 
proportional subsidies. Although the impact cannot be revealed 
in the structure of this model, its operation in reality must be 
very difficult and of high transaction costs.  
The authors believe that what is happening in most less 
developed countries follows the benchmark case with imperfect 
goods tradability and a few government redistributive policies. 
In this sense, the number of seasonal workers is likely to lie 
between the one in the benchmark equilibrium and social 
optimum one. Private insurance market, even it is perfect first-
best insurance market, cannot substitute for government 
redistributive policy and intervention is necessary. Specific 
policies depend on specific economic environment. Particularly, 
the criteria for “high” or “low” or the transaction costs is vague 
in the current model, which requires further empirical works to 
reveal.  
There are still several important issues that have not well 
framed and explained in this model. The CES utility function 
cannot reflect some important features of agriculture goods, 
especially subsistence products. A group of utility functions 
showing inelastic demand with respect to rural goods and 
perhaps embodying subsistence constraint of consumption will 
help to track the essential issues of disaster risk management 
for agriculture production better. Secondly, although the 
subsidy system on insurance premium is justified, it will be 
more appreciated if premium subsidy is framed as Pigovian 
tax/subsidy which equalizes the marginal social and individual 
costs in insuring disaster risk. In that case, the externality must 
be induced in the insuring process, which is beyond the 
structure of the current model. 
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